One contribution of 23 to a theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'. Emotion concepts are important. They help us to understand, experience and predict human behaviour. Emotion concepts also link the realm of the abstract with the realm of bodily experience and actions. Accordingly, the key question is how such concepts are created, represented and used. Embodied cognition theories hold that concepts are grounded in neural systems that produce experiential and motor states. Concepts are also contextually situated and thus engage sensorimotor resources in a dynamic, flexible way. Finally, on that framework, conceptual understanding unfolds in time, reflecting embodied as well as linguistic and cultural influences. In this article, we review empirical work on emotion concepts and show how it highlights their grounded, yet dynamic and context-sensitive nature. The conclusions are consistent with recent developments in embodied cognition that allow concepts to be linked to sensorimotor systems, yet be flexibly sensitive to current representational and action needs.
Introduction: the challenge of emotion concepts
To understand and predict themselves and others, humans use concepts that refer to mental states-invisible entities with physical manifestations [1, 2] . Crucial among such concepts are those that refer to affect, valence and emotion. These concepts can be deceptively simple-like 'good' and 'bad'-or more complex, as in 'regret' and 'schadenfreude'. In children, emotion concepts are closely tied to rudimentary affective reactions-simple 'yeahs' and 'yucks'-and are restricted to the so-called 'basic' emotions, such as 'happy', 'angry', 'disgusted' or 'afraid' [3] . Yet children appear to grasp two aspects of emotion concepts that are the hallmarks of 'abstraction': (i) they understand that emotion concepts refer to something created in the mind and (ii) they generalize to a variety of situations that differ widely in terms of their surface features [3] . Later in life, adults master complex emotional terms that require sophisticated cognitive distinctions, such as 'gratitude', 'resentment', 'desolation' or 'compunction'. They also grasp highly abstract concepts, like 'value', that help comprise fundamental principles underlying society (e.g. fairness, well-being, enlightenment and dignity [4] ), yet are still linked to affective states [5] .
So how do people represent and use these emotion concepts? How do people identify and comprehend everyday emotion words? Further, how do they use them in context-attaching meaning to emotional sentences such as 'every time she thought about his kiss, she was sick with disgust'? Here, we address these questions in the hope that research on emotion concepts can help illuminate the larger issue of the representation of abstract concepts [5, 6] . Emotion concepts are interesting in this regard because they are at once abstract, in that their definition recruits high-level relational schemas involving the subject and eliciting events in the world, and concrete, in that they concern subjective experience and are associated with palpable bodily states [7] . For example, in adults, the concept of love encompasses both a set of complex abstract relationships between the subject and the target in the world, and a & 2018 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
set of subjective felt experiences. This 'abstract-plus-concrete' combination makes emotion concepts interestingly different from other abstract concepts (e.g. democracy, wisdom, but see [8] ).
We suggest that grounded cognition, the proposal that conceptual processing uses somatosensory and motor resources, offers useful insights into emotion concepts [9, 10] . Critically, we emphasize the claim that links between concepts and somatosensory resources are dynamically shaped by the current context. As such, the context shapes the extent and pattern of somatosensory and motor involvement. For example, compare 'he felt disgusted with the government', 'she was nauseous with disgust' and 'her nose wrinkled with disgust'. Although they are all about disgust, each sentence emphasizes distinct facets of experience and thus should draw on different somatosensory resources-or none at all.
Below, we review basic findings suggesting that embodiment occurs when processing abstract emotion stimuli. We discuss the way emotional processing is impacted by situational context, task demands and current emotional state, highlighting the conditional embodiment of emotion concepts. Next, we address the difficult question of causality, and point to evidence that emotion processing is affected by the availability of somatosensory and motor resources. We conclude that while embodiment theories cannot satisfactorily account for all aspects of emotion processing, they have led to important empirical discoveries and theoretical developments, and remain a viable account of emotion concepts.
Emotion theories and embodiment of emotion concepts
The problem of emotion concepts is intrinsically tied to the more general (and contentious) question about the nature of emotion [11] . Nevertheless, nearly all emotion theories assume at least some role for somatosensory, interoceptive and motor content [12] . In fact, the basic idea that emotional thoughts are linked to the body is old. William James provided the canonical example of a bottom-up link: we know that we 'fear' a bear by perceiving changes in our own bodily state [13] . He also highlighted the top-down links, as in his famous quote that 'every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object' [14, p. 256] Importantly, in modern theories actual peripheral changes are not necessary for 'bodily' contributions to an emotion. Instead, these theories focus on neural resources for somatosensory and motor processing [15] . Indeed, rather than assuming that 'it all starts with the body', modern theories propose that emotions involve a cascade of events with somatosensory and motor resources recruited at multiple time points in perception, understanding, experience and production [11,16 -18] .
These 'as if' or real somatic recruitments need not be complete or conscious-only sufficient to be useful for conceptual operations. Importantly, as we elaborate later, the somatic engagements reflect not only reflexive, associative connections, but also strategic reenactments intended to support specific conceptual operations.
Given the importance of the body and its neural representation in emotion, it is perhaps unsurprising that the domain of emotion concepts has long been highlighted as a natural application for theories of embodied cognition [19] . In fact, much of the recent explosion in empirical research inspired by this framework comes from its extension to emotional life [20] . As such, embodiment theories have been applied to the processing of facial expressions, emotion regulation, consumer behaviour, social relations and even moral concepts [18, 21 -23] . Though we do not attempt a general emotion theory here, our perspective is generally consistent with the proposals offering a 'grounded conceptualization' account of emotion [21, 24] . Focusing on emotional words and concepts, we start by sketching out several accounts of how emotion concepts recruit bodily resources-including our own.
Potential accounts of embodiment effects in emotion concepts
It may be useful to distinguish different ways embodied responses are involved in the processing of emotion concepts. Though there are more possibilities, we distinguish four accounts.
(a) Winstonian
One reason emotion concepts might evoke a somatic response is that, like an inspiring speech by Winston Churchill, they provoke an emotional reaction that, in turn, triggers the bodily manifestation of the induced emotion. This 'Winstonian' account of emotional language posits a close relationship between emotion concepts and the experience of emotion. However, it is not an embodied account because affective activations in the brain and somatic responses in, for example, the face, are not part of the cause of emotional language comprehension, but the later result.
(b) Boy-band and somatic markers
On another type of account, somatic responses are reflexive associations evoked by particular words or images. The reflexive account has two variants, each differing in the importance of the somatic response for conceptualization. In the first, reflexive associations are epiphenomenal. Like a lip-synching boy band, somatic responses accompany conceptual activity, but play no causal role in the music of emotional inference. In the second variant, closely related to the Somatic Marker proposal [15] , reflexive links between emotion concepts and concurrent somatosensory and motor activity arise due to Hebbian learning, and provide some useful, and even essential elements of conceptual content.
(c) CODES
By contrast, we suggest that embodied simulation is dependent on cognitive needs and is context specific. In other words, if somatic recruitment is actually in the service of understanding, then the context should determine when and how embodiment is triggered. In particular, we suggest that embodied simulation is most useful in cases that require inferential elaboration. In the case of emotion, this is often needed for understanding and predicting the behaviour of others, but also for predicting and understanding oneself. These ideas echo the proposals that embodied simulations rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170127
can constitute a form of 'as needed' interoceptive predictions [25] and are recruited when there is a need to anticipate emotional consequences [26] . It differs somewhat from previous accounts in an emphasis on the flexibility of emotion concepts and the importance of context for the nature and extent of somatomotor recruitment. Consequently, we refer to our model as CODES, short for 'context-dependent embodied simulation'. Next, we describe some core empirical findings and relate them to the existing accounts. Most of the work will come from the literature on processing of single words and sentences, but, when relevant, we will also mention some studies on picture processing.
Empirical work on embodiment in processing of emotion concepts
From the perspective of embodied cognition, concept use involves partial reproduction and generation of perceptual, experiential and motor states that may occur when the perceiver actually encounters their extension [10] . As such, much support for embodied emotion concepts comes from studies in which participants process emotion words, ranging from simple concrete nouns, adjectives, emotion terms, to emotion sentences, while their bodily responses are monitored. Some of the evidence comes from studies using methods of psychophysiology and neuroscience (EMG, SCR, fMRI and EEG). Other evidence comes from behavioural studies on bodily involvement with measures of immediate action-such as actions taken to approach or avoid a stimulus. We first discuss some basic, simple effects in this domain, emphasizing the role of context in these apparently 'simple' effects. Then we address the evidence for the constitutive, causal contributions of bodily resources.
(a) Simple embodiment effects revealed by physiological and neuroscience measures
The basic idea that people react somatically to emotion words is over half a century old-dating back to studies on nonspecific autonomic arousal to briefly presented words (e.g. [27] ). Somewhat newer studies have used bodily measures that are sensitive to valence-discrimination, such as facial electromyography (EMG). For example, participants smile to positive and frown to negative words, though the physiological reactions to words are smaller than to pictures [28] . More recent work shows that action verbs (e.g. 'smile') produce a robust EMG response, but abstract adjectives (e.g. 'funny') only elicit a weak facial reaction [29] . When people read taboo words and reprimands, they show affective reactions, as measured by skin conductance, especially if such words appear in their native language [30] . Similar effects have been obtained with emotion words and facial EMG [31, 32] . Finally, many fMRI studies have shown that emotion words activate brain structures implicated in emotion and arousal [33, 34] . However, note that, while interesting, these demonstrations are rather uninformative about the underlying processes, and do not distinguish between different theoretical accounts.
(b) When is embodiment recruited/triggered?
According to our CODES model, embodied simulation is triggered by tasks that require semantic processing, but not by shallow tasks that can be done without accessing the meaning of the stimuli. In terms of emotion words, this was first tested by Niedenthal et al. [35] . In their studies, participants viewed words that either referred to emotional states (such as FOUL and JOYFUL), or whose referents aroused emotions (such as SUN and SLUG). Some participants were simply asked whether the words were capitalized or not (a shallow perceptual task), while others were asked whether the words were associated with an emotion (a deeper conceptual task). During both of these tasks, the activation of participants' facial muscles was measured with EMG. Consistent with the idea of contextdependent engagement of modal processing, facial muscles were activated in emotion-specific patterns when participants were evaluating the meaning of the words-but not when they made judgements of letter case. These results argue against both a simple association account, and a Winstonian one, on which seeing the word triggers observed bodily reactions. However, it is possible that participants in those tasks simply did not process the words sufficiently in the shallow conditions. To address this, Niedenthal et al. conducted another experiment explicitly designed to manipulate the strategic need for emotion simulation [35] . Participants generated features of emotional concepts (e.g. FRUSTRATION) by thinking of and listing associated properties, while facial EMG was recorded. Crucially though, depending on condition, participants were informed that the features were being produced either for an audience that was interested in emotional 'hot' features of the concepts (like a good friend with whom they have a close relationship and can share anything), or for an audience interested in more factual 'cold' features of the emotion concepts (like a supervisor with whom they have a formal relationship). Participants were able to produce normatively appropriate emotion features in both the 'hot' and 'cold' conditions-reflecting deep processing. However, the EMG showed that there was greater activation of the facial muscles when participants were asked for features of emotion words in the 'hot' compared with the 'cold' audience condition.
This finding is consistent with evidence that embodied simulations are recruited in concept understanding, but only when they are relevant for the task [36] . Again, this is important because it argues against the boy band idea that embodiment reactions are the by-products of conceptual processing (i.e. sensorimotor reflexes merely along 'for the ride'). These studies also argue against strong embodiment, the idea that embodied reactions are a necessary component of emotion understanding. After all, participants in the 'cold' condition were still able to successfully generate 'reasonable' emotion features (i.e. enough for outside raters to correctly assess their valence).
This suggests that though embodied responses can serve as input that informs understanding, there are alternative routes to (at least partial) understanding that do not require somatosensory, motor or experiential input. In the emotion literature, the canonical example of this phenomenon comes from a patient S.M. who has a rich conceptual knowledge about fear (from books, movies, conversations, etc.) without rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170127 the ability to experience the fear itself [11, 37] . A similar conclusion comes from the debate about the role of subjective colour experience in conceptual representation of colour concepts, where only select aspects of colour understanding are impaired in colour-blind individuals [38] .
(c) What specifically is embodied?
According to most models of concepts, people do not represent concepts in isolation, but within the relevant situational context. Our CODES model shares this assumption, based on a wide range of findings from cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, computational linguistics, psycholinguistics and semantics [10, [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] . One way in which context may shape embodied simulation is by foregrounding different aspects of an experience. Although abstract concepts tend to integrate experiences across different modalities [45] , the relative weight of a modality may differ depending on which experience is most relevant for understanding a particular instance of a mental state. Analogously, participants list different features for WATERMELON, such as green and striped, versus HALF-WATERMELON, such as red with seeds [36] . Presumably, the concept of 'half-watermelon' invites a different simulation (i.e. one dealing with internal properties, like red with seeds) than just 'watermelon' (i.e. one dealing with external properties, such as, green with stripes).
Analogously, emotional states (and other mental states) are multi-faceted, and their relevant features vary as a function of context. Emotional states have an internal or experiential component-people feel a certain way inside themselves when they experience these states (e.g. anger may feel tense or 'hot'). These internal experiences may be simulated when people need to understand a conceptual reference to an emotion state from this perspective. On the other hand, emotional states can also be described from an external perspective-where simulation of visible outside features or actions may be more relevant for understanding (e.g. anger makes the face red, may involve pounding on the table). In our work, we provided behavioural and neural evidence that embodied emotion simulation varies as a function of the processing context.
In one behavioural study using a switch costs paradigm, participants saw semantically unrelated sentences describing emotional and non-emotional mental states, while manipulating their 'internal' or 'external' focus [46] . To give a specific example, the concept of disgust could be presented in an internal sentence like 'she was sick with disgust' or an external sentence like 'her nose wrinkled with disgust'. Results showed that switch costs (slower RTs) occurred when participants shift between emotional sentences with an internal and external focus. A follow-up fMRI study showed that reading sentences about emotional states that imply an internal versus external perspective activates brain areas related to different aspects of the emotion process [47] . Specifically, emotion sentences written from the external perspective activate a region of the inferior frontal gyrus related to action representation, whereas sentences about the same emotion, but written from the internal perspective, activate a brain region associated with the generation of experiential states (i.e. the ventromedial prefrontal cortex).
A recent fMRI study expanded on the idea that, depending on current conceptual needs, emotion stimuli trigger distinct embodied simulations, and that such distinct simulations are involved in processing of emotion in both the self and in others [48] . Specifically, the authors asked participants to read sentences describing different aspects of emotion -action (e.g. pushing someone away), internal sensations (e.g. increased heart rate) and situations (e.g. being alone in a park at night)-and imagine themselves experiencing these different aspects. As expected, processing of these sentences resulted in clearly separable patterns of activity in networks related to action planning, somatosensory processing and metalizing. What is more interesting, the neural patterns from the self-focused sentence-reading task predicted participants' neural patterns when processing other people's emotion in a picture task. Specifically, in a separate task participants were presented emotion pictures and asked to focus on 'HOW' the target person expresses their emotion (i.e. action), 'WHAT' the person is feeling in their body (i.e. interoception) or 'WHY' they may feel it (i.e. situation). Using a multi-voxel classification technique, the patterns from the sentence-reading task successfully classified whether in the picture task participants focused on other people's actions, sensations or situations [48] .
All these findings emphasize that different embodied resources contribute to understanding emotion states from different points of view, and that specific grounded properties are recruited (or not) as a function of the current representational needs. This conclusion goes against simplistic accounts of emotion concepts as inflexible packages of somatic and motor reactions.
Similar conclusions about the shaping role of the context come from work on approach and avoidance actions. As proposed many years ago by Frijda, emotions are organized along an approach-avoidance dimension and are linked to action-tendencies [49] . For example, individuals are generally faster to approach positive stimuli and avoid negative stimuli [50, 51] . The initial claims about such effects assumed that affective stimuli spontaneously and rapidly trigger specific adaptive actions, without much involvement of conceptual processes. For instance, initially, these approach-avoidance tendencies were reported to follow body-centred direction, such as lever movements toward versus away from the subject's own body [52] , or specific muscle activations, such as bicep flexion versus tricep extension [53] . However, subsequent investigations have found approach-avoidance effects in symbolic contexts in which participants' movements brought the object closer or farther from their names on a screen [45, 54] . In sum, while some concept -action connections could be simple, many such connections are fragile and readily shaped by situational factors such as the specific task and motivational context [55, 56] .
(d) Causal, constitutive role of embodied reactions
As mentioned, some proportion of these data can be simply explained by the Winstonian account that emotion words elicit emotional states, which then manifest in bodily reactions (e.g. the word 'rat' makes people afraid which then makes them sweat and squirm). How then, might we explain the context sensitivity of embodied reactions and their dependence on current processing needs? True, a fan of the boy band account might accommodate context sensitivity by arguing that such data show that different epiphenomenal associations activate as a function of the current context rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170127 ([57] , for a similar arguments in the literature on imitation, see [58] ). However, some evidence suggests that, rather than being a by-product of conceptualization, embodied simulations can play a causal role in the processing of emotion concepts. We present some of the available evidence below, while acknowledging its limitations.
For example, it has long been known that detection of emotion words recruits basic affective circuitry [33, 34, 59] . More recent evidence suggests that word processing is facilitated by a specific congruence between an individual's level of bodily arousal and the emotional arousal of a to-be processed stimulus. Specifically, Kever et al. [60] used the classic attentional blink paradigm that requires detection of a target word in a stream of distractors. They found that externally increasing participants' physiological arousal improves their ability to report high arousal T2 words (e.g. terror), whereas externally reducing arousal improves reports of low arousal T2 words (e.g. flower). These findings suggest that bottom-up manipulations of bodily variables can alter early, low-level stages of emotion word processing.
Higher level language processing was addressed in a study in which participants' faces were discretely configured to display particular emotions prior to judging the sensibility of sentences that contained emotional content [61] . In this study, comprehension responses were faster when facial emotion and sentence emotion matched, than when they mismatched. In another study, authors first used subcutaneous injections of Botox (neurotoxin that causes temporary muscular denervation) to paralyse the facial muscle used in frowning, after which they had participants read emotional sentences [62] . The results showed that participants were slower to understand emotional sentences that involved the use of the paralysed muscle.
Niedenthal et al. addressed the role of facial action in emotion classification by asking participants to quickly sort words into emotion categories, anger, disgust, happy and neutral (see Study 3 in [35] ). During the sorting task, half the participants could move their faces freely, and half were prevented from moving the lower part of the face by holding a pen laterally between lips and teeth. In the blocking condition, participants showed reduced classification accuracy for words referring to emotions that involve movement of the lower part of the face (happiness and disgust), but not for words referring to other emotions. These findings support a causal and selective role for embodied simulation in emotion classification by suggesting the ability to make a congruent facial reaction helped participants recognize the emotional aspects of relevant words. Similar arguments have been made in the literature on recognition of emotion from faces [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] .
Of course, evidence from studies that rely on inhibiting sensory or motor components of facial expression is not definitive. First, it is possible that blocking manipulations ( pen, botox, TMS and lesions) disrupts the entrained way of processing words. That is, actual smiling may not be causally essential for understanding the word 'joy', but inhibiting spontaneous smiling may disrupt the standard sequence of steps that occur during processing of that word. The selectivity of the obtained effects somewhat reduces these concerns, but cannot fully address them. Second, the effects on behavioural measures of language comprehension are hard to interpret. After all, rather than influencing the comprehension process, changes in the classification accuracy, classification speed or judgements about the valence of words and sentences could reflect influences on decision processes, or reflect influences on general variables such as depth of processing, attention or interest in specific valenced material. Partly to address such concerns, and to better understand the temporal sequence of emotion processing, some studies have used neural markers of comprehension, as discussed next.
(e) Where and when: neural markers of comprehension suggest active use of embodied resources
To evaluate the importance of embodied simulation for the comprehension of emotional language, it is critical to know the precise timing of embodiment effects, and the linguistic level at which they occur. It is particularly important to know whether they occur on the individual word level or on the sentence level, where words are just one input to the dynamic meaning construction process [42, 61, 69, 70] . To investigate this, we conducted a joint ERP-EMG study in which participants read and then evaluated the emotional valence of sentences about positive and negative events [71] . An example sentences include: 'She reached inside the pocket of her coat from last winter and found some (cash/ bugs) inside it'. Facial action was manipulated by allowing or blocking spontaneous smiling to affective words, as confirmed by EMG. Interestingly, blocking smiling did not influence ERPs to the valenced words (e.g. cash and bugs). However, it increased N400 responses to the final words of sentences describing positive events, indicating greater semantic processing effort involved in comprehending the whole sentence in the blocking condition. This finding suggests that, when participants' goal is to determine the sentence valence, positive sentences evoke smiles and such facial action facilitates their semantic processing. Overall, this study offers evidence that embodiment causally impacts some aspects of high-level comprehension. At the same time, the results also qualify some previous strong claims, as sentence valence ratings were similar when facial action was blocked and when it was not. So, while embodied simulation made it easier for participants to compute the required affective meaning, they were still able to perform the task in the blocking condition.
(f ) Emotional language and metaphor
On the grounded framework, modal (somatosensory and motor) content plays a role in emotion processing, because it is naturally informative about relevant aspects of meaning. A somewhat different perspective comes from conceptual metaphor theory, in which abstract emotion concepts are linked to modal states via a conceptual bridge created between previously unmapped domains [72] . This perspective inspired a recent explosion of studies on the embodiment of social concepts, many of them closely linked to emotion [22, 73] . Some arguments in this literature propose that somatosensory information serves as the concrete source domain for abstract emotion concepts. For example, a pioneering study in this literature revealed a link between the valence of abstract words and vertical spatial location that occurs because metaphors often describe abstract affective concepts with references to vertical space (I'm feeling down) [74] . Specifically, participants were faster rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170127 determining that a word had a positive meaning if it appeared in the upper part of a screen, and faster at determining a negative meaning if it appeared in the screen's lower section. However, further research complicates this picture. One issue is that few such effects are strongly automatic, in the sense of occurring when participants engage in a simple reading or a lexical decision task. In fact, in order to find valence-space congruency effects, participants must usually be focused on processing valence [75] . One exception is words referring to emotions that are experientially tied to spatially specific body postures (e.g. happiness goes with an upright posture, whereas sadness tends to go with a slouched posture). Consistent with this idea, relevant emotion words seem to automatically activate vertical space (happy ! up; sad ! down), even in a shallow task that does not require valence judgement, (e.g. responding to ink colour with an up versus downwards directed movement) [76] . This finding resonates with evidence that experiential associations in space-valence mapping are more important than metaphorical associations (e.g. 'right is good', in righthanders, but not for left-handers) [77] . Overall, such findings indicate embodied representations can be recruited automatically, but only when participants have a strong associative link from their previous experience-providing a limitation to our strongly contextual, need-based CODES model.
In line with this, ERP studies suggest vertical mappings work differently when they are metaphorical than when they are literal [78] . In one such study, EEG was recorded as participants moved ball bearings towards an upwards or a downwards target, and as they read words that were either literally associated with vertical space, such as 'ascend' and 'descend', or metaphorically associated via the GOOD IS UP metaphor in English (e.g. 'inspire', 'defeat'). Spatial compatibility effects were observed for both sorts of words beginning 500 ms post-onset, that is, after the initial stage of meaning access. However, only in literal words was there any evidence of early sensorimotor simulation [78] . These data are consistent with much of the literature on conceptual metaphor in showing that while metaphors are cognitively real-that is, when people understand metaphorical language they activate both the source and the target domains (e.g. vertical space and defeat)-primary sensory and motor cortices rarely participate in the initial stages of meaning construction [79] .
For completeness, it is also worth noting that while some scholars explore embodied meaning by testing the direct involvement of somatosensory processes in time-pressured comprehension tasks, others explore it in alternative ways. For example, when people talk about love, their gestures externalize spatial metaphors, such as that between upwards motion and improvement in a relationship [80] . This literature suggests that associations between verticality and emotion might be purely linguistic for some speakers, yet grounded in the visual experience of such gestures in others, and grounded in the somatomotor experience of still others. Moreover, this literature offers some clue to the causal role of bodily experience. Namely, by making different source domains salient, the bodily experience of speakers can shape metaphorical understandings of emotional targets. For example, previously performing the action of drinking, versus the action of searching, changes whether the same picture of a smiling person is interpreted as joy versus happiness, presumably because drinking invites conceptualization as a 'container' (full of joy) whereas searching invites conceptualization of a 'quest' (searching for happiness) [81] .
In fact, one thing the literature on emotion metaphors makes abundantly clear is that emotion concepts do not reduce to a single metaphorical construal [82] . One classic example for this is 'love' which can be understood as a journey, a flower, a game or a unity [72] . In turn, different metaphorical framings can impact emotional reactions, as shown by a study where participants were more distressed by relationship conflicts when love was metaphorically construed as a 'unity' than a 'journey' [83] . The variability of connections between emotion concepts and embodied reactions may help explain the wildly disparate results in the muddy literature on physical 'disgust' and morality [84 -87] , including the failure to obtain such effects altogether [88] . Concerns about replication, notwithstanding, this literature highlights the flexibility of the links between emotion concepts and embodiment. For a similar theoretical point related to the flexibility of links between social concepts and action, see [89] .
Some complications for the embodied account
Finally, let us briefly address some important criticisms of the embodiment account. Critics correctly point out that many studies cannot differentiate theoretical models that argue for the embodied representation of concepts [10] from those that suggest a combination of 'core' amodal conceptual content, with some distributed modal contributions [90, 91] . In these latter models, the assumption is that, while contextdependent representations of meaning may sometimes be supported by sensorimotor activations, concepts have context-independent and amodal 'conceptual cores'. Interpreted along these lines, the 'core' conceptual meaning of words like anger, disgust and love is computed by an amodal hub, and embodied contributions influence peripheral aspects of meaning.
There are several reasons we are not very troubled by this criticism. For one, the notion of a 'conceptual core' makes sense when dealing with classical concepts with formal definitions (e.g. the concept of a triangle), but runs into problems with fuzzy concepts like 'game' [92] . And, while fuzzy concepts (like 'game' or 'art') need not be embodied, their specification extends beyond simple 'core' properties. We assume that in their use of emotion concepts (like most concepts), people make extensive use of 'peripheral' information, such as prototypes, exemplars, correlated properties and intuitive theories, and that such information is part of the semantic memory representation [41] .
A key part of our CODES model is the proposal that emotion concepts differ from other abstract concepts in having some form of bodily information as critical, necessary (but not sufficient) components. In defining anger, for example, one might point to the belief that unfair harm occurred and that retribution is justified. However, without assuming some (any) modal content, there is no meaningful way of stating that a person's concept is about an emotion, as opposed to being just a set of 'cold' beliefs [24] . This makes emotion concepts interestingly different from other abstract concepts that might conceivably be understood rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170127 without reference to any modal information (e.g. wisdom, democracy, but see [8] ). Of course, we wish to emphasize that our principle of 'no emotion representation without some embodied simulation' allows for different emotions to be very similar in terms of their embodied components (e.g. embarrassment, shame and guilt), with subtle conceptual distinctions playing a key role in their differentiation [21] . The specific nature of this other, non-embodied representational content of emotion concepts and its interaction with embodied content is poorly understood but multiple representation accounts of abstract concepts hold some promise [6] .
Finally, we wish to reemphasize that in lacking a definable core, emotion concepts are no different from other concepts, be they concrete ones, such as bowl, or abstract ones, such as time [93] . Although the importance of definitional cores is, in principle, orthogonal to questions of representational format, our commitment to a role for episodic memories in concepts entails an important role for perceptual, motoric and interoceptive features in their representation. Crucially, however, the same dynamic nature of concepts that makes it difficult to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for their application, implies that only a subset of the semantic network is active at a given time. As we have shown, the modal content of an emotion concept is not always activated during trivial or routinized processing. More critically, and like any other aspect of a concept, when activated, the particular modal content depends on contextual factors (e.g. recall studies showing the flexibility of somatosensory and motor information activated when processing emotion sentences in different contexts and task sets) [47, 48] .
Conclusion
On our perspective, conceptual processing involves the partial reuse and reinstatement of experiential and motor states associated with concept acquisition, as well as active, productive, context-sensitive, 'as needed' use of somatosensory resources. Reactivation of the sensorimotor systems can play a causal and informative role in understanding of emotional stimuli during real-world interactions. However, embodied responses do not always appear to be necessary to perceive or understand affective information. Thus, while we embrace the strengths of the embodiment perspective, it is clear that a satisfactory account must describe the interaction of embodied processes with conceptual processes. Recent years have seen progress in the development of multiple representation accounts of abstract concepts. Reflecting this, future work should further explore the interplay between sensorimotor, conceptual, language and cultural resources as they mutually shape emotion understanding.
